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Introduction
Many interventions that aim at improving accuracy 
in memory tasks, whether explicitly or not, refer to 
meta cognitive processes (e.g. attending to the source 
of informa tion). The idea of relating memory performance 
to metacognition is in line with a very general idea about 
human cognition, i.e. that the processing of information 
involves at least two separate but interrelated levels: 
the level of basic processes (object -level), and the meta-
-level. The basic framework for this idea has been provided 
by Nelson and Narens’ theory (1990). The crucial part of 
their theory is the flow of information between these two 
levels. Most importantly, they assume that the meta -level 
modifies the object -level which is called control. To keep 
the control processes adequate, the meta -level is informed 
by monitoring processes about any changes in the object-
-level.
This idea also translates into models of memory. In 
this sense, remembering is not a simple retrieval of what 
is (or is not) in memory, but more complex judgement 
process, the outcome of which depends on both memorial 
and other, external to the memory system, sources 
of information (Nash, Wheeler, & Hope, 2015). This 
understanding of remembering is in line with Blank’s 
(2009) model of the remembering process. The model 
assumes that the accessed memory information is subject 
to conversion processes, first to be translated into memory 
beliefs, and then into memory statements.
The idea that overarching, more complex processes 
influence and control more basic ones is definitely not new. 
Unsurprisingly, there is a considerable number of studies on 
the role of metacognition in retrieval, including the impact 
of metacognition on memory performance. Also, many 
interventions from other research areas, e.g. postwarnings 
in the misinformation effect literature or interventions in 
the forensic studies that are aimed at improving memory 
performance, refer to metacognitive processes. At the same 
time, according to Blank and Launay (2014, p. 86), 
“compared to what we know about the ‘hard’ memory 
processes involved in encoding, storage, and retrieval, 
we know very little about these ‘soft’ memory conversion 
processes”. This may stem from the fact that studies, at 
least partly, use very different approaches. Thus, theoretical 
and empirical integration is likely to provide valuable 
insights.
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Such an integration is the main goal of this article. 
When analysing the existing theoretical proposals and 
most up -to -date empirical data, our goal will be to answer 
two questions: (1) through what processes and mechanisms 
metacognition affects retrieval, (2) how memory accuracy 
and/or quantity can be improved with metacognitive 
interventions. Based on these analyses, we will identify and 
discuss the problems that need to be solved and propose 
new venues for research.
Core assumptions regarding the relationship 
between metacognition and memory retrieval
The strategic regulation of memory performance:
Monitoring and control
A significant part of research that has focused on 
improving memory performance via metacognition referred 
to Koriat and Goldsmith’s (1996) model of strategic 
regulation of memory by metamemorial processes of 
monitoring and cont rol. Their model is similar to the model 
of Nelson and Narens (1990) that was described in 
the first paragraph. However, whereas Nelson and Narens’ 
model is relatively general and refers to various aspects 
of human cognition, the model proposed by Koriat and 
Goldsmith is focused on retrieval and is more applicable 
to remembering events (Niedzwienska, 2004a). In the real-
-life situations, a significant part of the remembering 
process is individual’s control over volunteering (or not) 
each piece of information, including details connected 
to it. This control is highly influenced by situational 
characteristics, such as incentives to be accurate or potential 
costs of making a mistake (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). As 
different contexts require different levels of accuracy, such 
strategic regulation of remembering plays a major role in 
making memory a useful system when situational demands 
change. The control processes are influenced not only by 
external information, like situational characteristics and 
functional incentives, but also by another metamemory 
process, i.e. monitoring. The monitoring mechanism is 
used “to subjectively assess the correctness of potential 
memory responses” (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996, p. 493). 
This assessment strongly contributes to strategic control, 
as only when the assessed probability that the piece 
of information is correct is higher than the criterion of 
probability assumed as necessary, the response will be 
provided. Importantly, the authors claim that while memory 
accuracy is under strategic control, memory quantity is not: 
incentives affect accuracy performance, but not quantity 
performance.
The crucial q uestion of this paper is how exactly 
metacognition influences memory accuracy. According to 
Koriat and Goldsmith’s framework (1996), the accuracy of 
retrieval largely depends on the monitoring effectiveness 
(monitoring resolution). As the monitoring process serves 
to assess if (and with what probability) a particular candi-
date answer is correct, monitoring resolution describes the 
extent to which this assessment is correct, which is a sort 
of monitoring ability. The general rule is that as monitoring 
resolution increases, the improvement in accuracy can 
be gained with smaller costs in quantity. Therefore, if 
resolution was perfect, no quantity -accuracy trade -off 
would be observable. Some level of monitoring resolution 
is essential as otherwise the exercise of strategic regulation 
would be useless or even detrimental (Koriat & Goldsmith, 
1996). Apart from monitoring effectiveness, memory 
performance strongly depends on control sensitivity, 
i.e. the level to which the control process (withholding 
vs volunteering an answer) responds to the monitoring 
output. 
Metamemory appraisals in autobiographical memory
Another, more recent idea on how metacognition 
influences retrieval stems from autobiographical memory 
research and is not strictly related to accuracy. Various 
metacognitive appraisals contribute to the remembering 
process (Otgaar, Scoboria, & Mazzoni, 2017). Scoboria, 
Talarico and Pascal (2015) have found that recollection of 
the event, belief in its occurrence and belief in the accuracy 
of the recollection are distinct aspects of remembering epi-
sodes. When participants rated recalled events on various 
characteristics, structural equation modelling revealed that 
variance in ratings was best explained by these three latent 
variables. The findings were replicated in the second study 
in which confirmatory modelling techniques were used. 
The distinction between autobiographical recollections and 
autobiographical beliefs has also been present in previous 
research and theorising (e.g. Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2002; 
Scoboria, Jackson, Talarico, Hanczakowski, Wysman, & 
Mazzoni, 2014).
Many researchers (e.g. Otgaar et al., 2017; Scoboria 
et al., 2015) argue that the distinction between recollection 
and autobiographical belief has been much overlooked and 
that they have often been confounded in memory research. 
This confusion may result from the fact that research, both 
using cued - and spontaneous recall, typically elicits events 
which are both vividly recollected and strongly believed 
(Scoboria & Talarico, 2013). However, this is only one 
of many possible combinations of these two constructs 
(Otgaar et al., 2017).
Another reason for this confusion is the counter-
-intuitiveness of the notion that the recollection and belief 
are separate constructs that do not necessarily co -vary. 
However, in most cases, recollections resemble reality 
and therefore some default reliance on the recollection 
is adaptive. This is well described in Blank’s (2017) 
theoretical proposal, in which recollection is “a raw 
output of the memory system” (p. 869) and has to be 
“reality checked” before it becomes a believed memory. 
Both recollection and the sources of information that are 
external to the memory system (e.g. knowledge about 
event’s plausibility) contribute to building one’s memories, 
i.e. they contribute to the validation process. The validation 
process may be executed in an automatic, heuristic 
way (System 1 -type) or it may involve more elaborate, 
effortful way of information processing and decision 
making (System 2 -type). This distinction corresponds to 
the difference between the two systems of thinking that was 
introduced by Kahneman (2011). In most cases, the “rule” 
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is to just rely on recollections and the automatic reality 
checking. However, more extensive reality checking that 
involves elaborate and effortful processing is sometimes 
required. Whether recollections will be transformed into 
memory beliefs through System 1 -type or System 2 -type 
processing depends on three main factors.
The first one is the quality of recollections. Scoboria 
et al. (2015) have found that event’s plausibility predicts 
belief in its occurrence more strongly for uncertain events, 
which is consistent with their more gen eral argument 
that autobiographical belief is more likely to be derived 
directly from recollection if the recollection is strong and 
clear. In contrast, when recollection is vague and perceived 
as unreliable, other sources of information become more 
significant and the divergences between rec ollections and 
beliefs are more likely to occur. However, Scoboria et al. 
(2014a) argue that the degree of correspon dence between 
the dimensions of recollection and belief in occurrence is 
not strong even for strongly recollected, believed memories. 
This suggests that the decision whether the event took place 
cannot be based on the recollection alone.
The second factor is the availability of resources. 
When resources are low, relying on one’s recollection 
accompanied by only superficial reality check is more 
likely to be chosen. The third factor that influences the 
choice of strategy is the representation of the situation, 
i.e. “how much is at stake”. When accuracy is vital and the 
costs of making a mistake are high, the more extensive, 
System 2 -type validation is more adequate (Blank, 2017). 
This last factor is well illustrated in the case study of 
a person who clearly changed his public narrative of 
the event in which he had participated a decade before 
(Rechdan, Sauerland, Hope, & Ost, 2016). The story was 
repeated many times, and when the final distorted report 
was given, not only many years had passed from the 
original event, but also the report was given at the night 
show. That circumstance most likely shifted the criterion 
towards entertainment rather than accuracy, and boosted 
the role of such mechanisms as audience tuning, bringing 
the Self closer to the action or confounding the own 
account with that of other people. A more thorough 
and systematic way of validation would have probably 
been chosen if the aim of re -telling the story was not to 
entertain, but to be as accurate as possible (Rechdan 
et al., 2016).
Accuracy regulation
The relationship between the validation process in 
autobiographical memory and memory performance is 
less clear, compared to Koriat’s and Goldsmith’s frame-
work (1996), and there is hardly any research in which 
the predictions presented in the previous paragraph have 
been tested. This perspective, in spite of the interest it 
has aroused, currently does not explain how different 
sources of evidence are weighted and combined (Scoboria 
et al., 2014a). Yet, the perspective differs substantially 
from the understanding of the context information 
that has been proposed in the misinformation effect 
studies or false memories studies (e.g. McCloskey & 
Zaragoza, 1985; Mazzoni, Loftus, & Kirsch, 2001), in 
which the context information is simply incorrect and 
presented to mislead a participant. In contrast, Scoboria 
and colleagues argue (2014a, p. 36) that the context 
information is a complementary source, which can serve 
to enhance memory performance: “non -memorial, belief-
-like information is often used for the better to inform 
recognition judgments, particularly in situations in which 
memory is absent or fails”. In other words, the best 
accuracy is not to be gained due to constant relying on 
recollection only, but rather due to using information 
from both recollection and context for the better. This 
way, the judgements of accuracy and decisions about 
the occurrence of an event or specific details, which 
represent the final step in any memory task (Scoboria 
et al., 2014a), are those aspects of memory monitoring 
that are used together with recollection to arrive at beliefs 
about the past. By analogy to the strategic regulation of 
memory model (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996), we assume 
that these monitoring processes can be better or worse 
calibrated and, regardless of calibration, have better or 
worse resolution. Depending on these characteristics, 
monitoring processes can be beneficial or detrimental 
for accuracy of translating recollections into believed 
memories.
The basic assumption is that just as the exercise 
of strategic control can be more or less present in the 
situation of retrieval, autobiographical memories are 
sometimes “directly accessed, and sometimes they are 
more generative” (Ost, Scoboria, Grant, & Pankhurst, 
2016, p. 43). Accordingly, just like the exercise of 
strategic control in the conditions of poor monitoring 
resolution is likely to reduce quantity without increasing 
accuracy, the monitoring processes in autobiographical 
memory can also sometimes hinder retrieval and lead to 
worse results, compared to relying simply on recollection 
(Scoboria et al., 2014a). Similarly, as in the conditions of 
good resolution the exercise of strategic control improves 
performance, the monitoring processes in autobiographical 
memory (e.g. considering social input, weighing evidence 
about the past) can lead to better memory performance, 
compared to relying simply on recollection. However, 
it is worth stressing that, generally, the exercise of 
strategic control does improve accuracy; the accuracy 
is higher in the conditions of free recall compared 
to the conditions of forced recall, as the latter makes 
the strategic control impossible (Koriat & Goldsmith, 
1996). The strategic control in autobiographical memory 
also includes encouraging (and sometimes enabling) 
the “I don’t know” responses as well as other methods 
of regulating the memory report, such as changing 
grain size. The research suggests that witnesses may not 
spontaneously engage in strategic control by, for instance, 
changing grain size for “coarser”, unless they are told that 
they can or are required to do so (Goldsmith, Pansky, & 
Koriat, 2014). Promoting the “don’t know” or “haven’t seen 
that” responses is widely known to enhance the quality of 
memory report (Scoboria & Fisico, 2013; Scoboria, Memon, 
Trang, & Frey, 2014b).
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In search of theoretical integration
Both perspectives outlined above argue that decision 
processes play an important role in retrieval, and that 
retrieving items from memory (or recollecting events) and 
deciding about their source arise from distinct processes.
The ideas from metamemory research about set-
ting response criterion (e.g. Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996), 
and ideas of more or less extensive validation processes 
(System 1 -type vs System 2 -type) that have been proposed 
in the autobiographical memory literature (e.g. Blank, 
2017) are in many ways consistent with the source 
moni toring framework (SMF). Therefore, SMF may 
serve as a common ground for these two perspectives.
The SMF (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; 
Lindsay, 2008) derives from the theory of persuasion 
and attitude change, i.e. the Heuristic -Systematic Model 
(Chaiken, 1980) which is based on the general principle 
that people can make attributional judgements either 
heuristically or systematically (Nash, Wheeler, & Hope, 
2015). The SMF assumes that the continuum of these 
two ways of processing provides a choice of strategy for 
deciding whether particular mental experience is a memory 
or not. The heuristic way of processing is rapid and requires 
less resources, whereas the systematic way is effortful and 
analytic. Importantly, the very choice of the strategy is 
influenced by the set of motivational and social factors. 
One of these factors is the rememberer’s current orientation 
either to (1) volunteer only accurate information and report 
only those aspects of the event which truly took place, or, 
for example, (2) entertain, or be as informative as possible, 
even at the cost of making a mistake (Lindsay, 2006). This 
is very much in line with the idea of the control mechanism, 
i.e. setting the criterion, according to which the decision 
about volunteering a candidate answer is made.
The key question in the SMF is thus the origin of 
mental experiences; whether they come from perception 
of the event/information (i.e. are real memories) or 
originate from other sources (e.g. imagination, other 
events, information from other people) (Nash et al., 2015). 
In autobiographical memory research, the key process is 
the reality checking which involves accepting a particular 
recollection as a belief about the past or rejecting it as 
not being a real memory. These two processes (deciding 
about the origin of mental experience and reality check) 
have similar assumptions and thus correspond to each 
other. Working of the motivational factors in the SMF is 
likely to be mediated by the mechanisms of control that 
are based on setting the control criterion, and informed 
by monitoring processes, as proposed by Koriat and 
Goldsmith’s theory (1996).
The compatibility of the SMF and the validit y processes 
in autobiographical memory is  even more visible when 
the reality monitoring framework (Johnson & Raye, 1981) 
is taken into consideration. Reality monitoring framework 
is a now classic theory which preceded the SMF. Reality 
monitoring refers to “the processes by which a person 
attributes a memory to an external or an internal source” (p. 
67). The authors acknowledge that the memories of thoughts 
are as “real” as those coming from perception. For example, 
both types of remembered information have a potential to 
direct human behaviour (Johnson & Raye, 1981). However, 
in the language of the reality monitoring model, “real” refers 
to the external to one’s “mind” (Johnson & Raye, 1981).
The general premise of the reality monitoring 
framework is the same as the general idea of the reality 
checking model that was proposed by Blank (2017). 
That is that the content of our cognition (e.g. a thought, 
something that feels like memory) is attributed to one’s 
personal past due to a decision processes, and not just by 
virtue of appearing in one’s mind. However, the Blank’s 
idea is mostly focused on the judgements of plausibility 
and the interpretation of social information (e.g. accepting 
others’ memories as a credible source of knowledge about 
the past), whereas the reality monitoring model puts more 
emphasis on the characteristics of mental contents. For 
example, memories coming from the external sources 
have more spatial, perceptual and temporal characteristics 
encoded in the structure of representation than those of 
the internal origin (Johnson & Raye, 1981; Johnson, 
Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1989). Garrison and colleagues 
(Garrison, Bond, Gibbard, Johnson, & Simons, 2017, 
p. 109) summarize this difference in the following way: 
“Memory traces of perceived information and imagined 
events are different on average, with greater cognitive 
operations content for self -generated information and 
greater sensory and contextual detail in memories of 
perceived information”. Johnson and colleagues (Johnson 
& Raye, 1981; Johnson & Raye, 2000; Garrison et al., 
2017) acknowledge that other types of information that 
are related to more deliberate processes of considering 
knowledge about the past and external evidence also play 
a role in the attribution process, but the qualities of mental 
contents are the key component.
The models that distinguish autobiographical belief 
and recollection usually also name the third aspect of 
autobiographical remembering, i.e. belief in accuracy. 
Scoboria, Talarico and Pascal (2015) argue that, at 
least in some ways, confidence ratings as the outcome 
of monitoring and beliefs in accuracy appraisals are 
conceptual relatives. However, the authors claim (p. 346) 
that the relationship between “confidence in individual 
event details (measured in much of the work on memory 
and metacognition) and overarching accuracy appraisals 
for whole events are unknown at this time”.
How to improve retrieval accuracy 
and/or quantity via metacognitive cues: New ideas
The key assumption about the relationship between 
metacognition and memory performance is straightforward: 
more accurate metacognition leads to better memory 
performance. As mentioned in the previous section, 
strategic regulation of memory became a useful framework 
for further exploration. Apart from monitoring resolution 
described above, another index of the quality of monitoring 
processes can be calculated, i.e. calibration. Calibration is 
the measure of absolute correspondence between assessed 
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probabilities and proportions correct. Good calibration is 
not automatically accompanied by good resolution. For 
example, the assessment of .50 subjective correctness, 
when accompanied by .50 actual correctness, means perfect 
calibration. But only the index of monitoring resolution 
provides the information about how effectively the person 
distinguished between correct and incorrect responses 
among the total of correct and incorrect answers. 
Reducing overconfidence
In their seminal work (1996), Koriat and Goldsmith 
have noticed that monitoring processes are usually well 
calibrated but people often tend to be overconfident. 
Indeed, research shows that people are overconfident not 
only in memory and knowledge, but also in relation to 
many other abilities such as time needed to complete an 
academic assignment (Buehler, Griffin, & Ross, 1995) or 
dating popularity (Preuss & Alicke, 2009). Thus, reducing 
overconfidence seems a reasonable way of enhancing 
the accuracy of metacognition.
This was investigated by Miller and Geraci (2014). 
They found that failing to report practice items decreased 
the participants’ predictions of performance for the target 
questions. Those who experienced a “proper dose” of 
retrieval failure were thus more accurate; their predictions 
were more like their actual recall performance. It is note-
worthy that the experience of failure does not always lead to 
better metacognitive accuracy. For example, the prior exam 
performance was not sufficiently used by the school students 
to adjust their performance predictions and they remained 
overconfident irrespectively of the exams results (Foster, 
Was, Dunlosky, & Isaacson, 2016). Though the nature of 
overconfidence in episodic and autobiographical memory is 
unclear, when we take into consideration that the witnesses 
do not usually regulate their memory spontaneously (see 
the second section), it is vital to provide and encourage 
“linguistic opt -outs”, i.e. the option not to answer 
the questions if the answer is unknown (Ost et al., 2016).
Affecting the relative retrieval fluency
A similar idea was implemented by Pansky and 
Goldsmith (2014). They focused on the metacognitive 
cue, namely the relative retrieval fluency that is defined 
as “the relative ease or difficulty of answering questions 
from memory” (Pansky & Goldsmith, 2014, p. 1255). 
The “relative” means that the discrepancy between the 
expected and actual fluency is of particular importance 
(Portnoy & Pansky, 2016). This cue is used as a heuristic 
in remembering and serves to evaluate the accuracy of 
a particular piece of information. The prediction was that 
the relative retrieval fluency would affect monitoring and 
control processes and thus influence decision whether to 
give an answer to the question or not (Pansky & Goldsmith, 
2014). Indeed, they found that presenting the initial set of 
difficult questions to the participants resulted in the higher 
confidence held for the target questions, which translated 
into the higher rate of reported answers. What is more, this 
gain in memory quantity for the free -report tasks had no 
costs in accuracy.
The study by Pansky and Goldsmith (2014), in 
which semantic material was used, was then replicated to 
check their predictions on episodes (Portnoy & Pansky, 
2016). The results of the two studies were similar: when 
preceded by the difficult initial questions, answers to 
the target questions concerning the event were rated with 
more confidence and thus more frequently volunteered. 
In neither experiment, the relative fluency influenced 
the ability to answer the set of target questions; unlike 
the free -report performance, forced -report performance 
was not influenced by the initial questions. This confirms 
the view that strategic control of memory is exercised only 
under free -report conditions (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). 
Another way of improving the overall memory performance 
is the moderation of accuracy incentive. The research 
(e.g. Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996) shows that very high 
incentive for accuracy (e.g. loss of all the monetary bonuses 
won so far due to any incorrect answer given) provides 
gain in accuracy, but leads to substantial quantity costs, 
while the moderate -incentive conditions are much more 
“profitable” in the sense of quantity -accuracy trade off.
The metamemory training procedures
Scoboria, Memon, Trang and Frey (2014) used 
a procedure that was aimed at improving metacognitive 
accuracy and enhancing responding to questions. 
The training procedure was based on research on memory 
and metacognition and involved the set of prompts that had 
been previously identified as having the potential to improve 
responding. For example, based on the source monitoring 
framework, the training involved attending to the source 
from which the retrieved information came from. Based on 
the finding that people sometimes respond to the questions 
they do not in fact understand, or even entirely meaningless 
ones, another prompt was to attend to the features of 
the question. Other prompts encouraged the participants 
to search memory thoughtfully and thoroughly, weigh 
confidence and select the best possible answer rather than 
rely on automatic responses. This training procedure proved 
to be effective, i.e. it enhanced responding to the questions 
about a witnessed event. More specifically, the trained group 
correctly rejected more unanswerable questions (questions 
about the information that was not present in the witnessed 
event and thus cannot be answered correctly) compared to 
the control group. Moreover, this happened with no cost in 
the number of attempted questions. Also accuracy, measured 
as the ratio of correct responses to questions answered, 
was higher in the trained group.  The second experiment 
was conducted to rule out the explanation that the more 
frequent rejection of responding to unanswerable questions 
was the effect of sheer awareness that the set of questions 
might have included unanswerable ones. Indeed, when 
participants received the information that: “it is possible that 
some of the questions that I ask may not have an answer” 
(Scoboria, Memon, Trang, & Frey, 2014, p. 213), the warned 
group simply responded to fewer questions compared to 
the control group, with no improvement in accuracy.
The interventions to improve metacognitive accuracy 
presented above were confined to a short period of 
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time and their effects were measured immediately after 
the intervention. It is possible, though, that the change 
caused by a single experimental manipulation and obser-
ved immediately after that, may not stem from the same 
mechanisms as the change caused by a long-term manipu-
lation. Such a manipulation was used by Niedzwienska 
(2004b). The aim of the study was to explore whether 
participation in a 30 -hour course on autobiographical 
memory, and thus exposure to scientific -based beliefs 
about memory and a gain in metamemory knowledge, 
would influence participants’ recollections of personal 
events. More specifically, if the participants provided with 
metamemory knowledge would be more accurate in their 
subsequent recalls than those who did not receive a training.
In the recollections of both groups, a large number 
of new elements was introduced in the second recall of 
a personal event, which were not present in the first recall. 
Participation in the course between the first and the second 
recall did not influence the number of new elements, but 
this variable cannot be classified as the memory distortion 
measure. The change of context of retrieval may account 
for this result. In fact, research shows that different 
elements may constitute the reports of the same event given 
in different contexts, and yet the accuracy of these reports 
will be similar (e.g. Drivdahl & Hyman, 2014).
However, the participants who experienced the train-
ing committed significantly fewer overt errors, which 
was the “proper” memory distortion measure based on 
the number of details given in the second recall that 
contradicted the information given by the participant 
in the first recall. What is more, this difference did not 
result from changing grain size (how general or specific 
the answers to the questions were), changing the length 
of the answers or skipping some questions. Not only their 
accuracy was better, but also a rise in quantity due to 
participation in the course was observed.
The cognitive interview procedures
A cognitive interview (Geiselman, Fisher, McKinnon, 
& Holland, 1986) represents a different category of inter-
ventions that aim at enhancing memory performance. It was 
based on the research and theory of cognitive psychology 
and developed to address the problem of little structure and 
training in police interviewing (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992). 
The cognitive interview is based on four general ideas to 
improve retrieval (Geiselman et al., 1986): (1) mental 
reinstatement of the event’s context (both personal and 
environmental), (2) encouragement to report everything, 
regardless of the perceived importance, (3) reporting 
the events in changed order, and (4) reporting the events 
from different perspectives. Changing of order and perspec-
tives was designed to promote using many retrieval paths. 
If information cannot be accessed via one path, it is still 
possible that it can be accessed via another (Tulving, 1974). 
The incentive to report everything may be beneficial both 
due to the fact that some witnesses may not now which 
piece of information is important, and because the retrieval 
of details that are irrelevant may support the retrieval of 
other pieces of information (Geiselman et al., 1986).
As a cognitive interview was designed in the applied 
context, its aim is not only to boost the memory per-
formance of a witness, but also to contribute to the witness’ 
well -being (Fisher & Geiselman, 2010). For the present 
purposes, the crucial question is the influence of the method 
on the accuracy and quantity of a memory report.
Some studies suggest that a cognitive interview, 
compared to a standard interview, allows to obtain more 
comprehensive report, and the increase in the number of 
correct details is not accompanied by costs in accuracy 
(Geiselman et al., 1986; Dukala, Sporer, & Polczyk, 
2018). Fisher and Geiselman (2017) argue that the typical 
finding in the studies that tested the efficacy of cognitive 
interview is the increase of 35–50% in the number of 
reported details (compared to the control, police interview), 
with the accuracy rate, as measured by the percentage of 
correct responses, being “either the same or slightly higher 
for the CI than the control, police interview” (p. 454). 
To our knowledge, there have been two meta -analyses 
on the effects of the cognitive interview procedure for 
the accuracy and quantity of memory reports (Kohnken, 
Milne, Memon, & Bull, 1999; Memon, Meissner, & Fraser, 
2010). The results of the first meta -analysis (Kohnken 
et al., 1999) indicate that, generally, the cognitive interview 
procedure resulted in an increase in recall of correct details, 
with accompanying (considerably smaller) increase in 
incorrect details. The second meta -analysis (Memon et al., 
2010) replicated the results that had been found a decade 
earlier; the increase in the amount of correct information 
was accompanied by a smaller increase in erroneous 
information reported.
Importantly, the increase in the recall of erroneous 
information after the cognitive interview procedure was 
not related to the decrease in overall accuracy: “In both 
the original and current meta -analysis we noted a small 
increase in the recall of erroneous details. The 1999 
meta -analysis indicated an increase in output was not 
accompanied by a drop in accuracy. The current meta-
-analysis which included a subset of studies that reported 
accuracy rates concludes the same.” (Memon et al., 2010, 
p. 357). In this way, the results of the two meta -analyses 
(Kohnken et al., 1999; Memon et al., 2010) are consistent 
with what Fisher and Geiselman (2017) report about 
the influence of the cognitive interview on the general 
accuracy and quantity of memory reports. Another 
important aspect of research on the cognitive interview is 
that its effects on memory were also found in a criminal 
setting (Fisher, Geiselman, & Amador, 1989).
Mechanisms underlying the actual improvement 
in memory performance
Is it possible to enhance resolution?
The results obtained in the study by Niedzwienska 
(2004b) suggest that the observed improvement in memory 
performance may have stemmed from better monitoring 
resolution: the experimental manipulation resulted in 
the rise of both accuracy and quantity. The improvement of 
accuracy with no costs in quantity is the pattern of results 
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which Koriat and Goldsmith (1996) attribute to very good 
monitoring effectiveness. 
More effective monitoring is also a possible 
explana tion of the improved quantity performance in 
the study by Niedzwienska (2004b): items which were 
correctly remembered were held more confidently by 
the participants who had attended the course (so their 
monitoring accuracy was better compared to the control 
group), and thus were more likely to be volunteered (or 
volunteered at a greater level of specificity) in comparison 
with the answers of the participants who had not attended 
the course.
The improvement in quantity due to experimental 
manipulation was also observed in the studies with 
the relative retrieval fluency manipulation (Pansky & 
Goldsmith, 2014; Portnoy & Pansky, 2016). As described 
previously, participants who were given the difficult test 
questions at the beginning, were later more confident about 
their answers and thus achieved higher quantity compared 
to the participants who were solving the easy question 
test. Interestingly, this improvement in quantity was not 
accompanied by costs in accuracy. Portnoy and Pansky 
(2016) investigated possible mechanisms of this pattern 
of results. They found that it was not due to the difference 
in monitoring effectiveness between the groups whose 
tests differed in initial difficulty. In fact, the difference in 
confidence ratings for correct and incorrect answers was 
comparable across both groups. However, they found that 
monitoring resolution in the medium confidence range 
(confidence ratings between .5 and .8) was very poor in 
both groups: “confidence judgements in this range did 
not significantly discriminate between correct answers 
(.63) and incorrect answers (.60)” (Portnoy & Pansky, 
2016, p. 163). Consistent with Koriat’s and Goldsmith’s 
reasoning (1996), in the conditions of lacking monitoring 
effectiveness the exercise of strategic control is not likely 
to enhance accuracy, but still leads to reduced quantity. 
Therefore, it seems that the experimental manipulation 
did not affect monitoring effectiveness in Portnoy and 
Pansky’s study.
Miller and Geraci (2014, p. 132), after reviewing 
a considerable set of data on the attempts to improve 
metacognitive accuracy (e.g. Thiede et al., 2003; Miller & 
Geraci, 2011), have concluded that “while a few of these 
attempts have been modestly successful at improving 
metacognitive monitoring accuracy, the general theme 
of this research is that metacognitive ability is highly 
resistant to change”. At the same time, the experimental 
manipulation that they used (Miller & Geraci, 2014) 
improved metacognitive accuracy; experiencing retrieval 
failure reduced overconfidence and made participants 
more accurate in their performance predictions compared 
to the group that did not experience retrieval failure. 
However, the fact that from some point the retrieval failure 
reduced participants confidence too much (made their 
predictions of performance less accurate) suggests that 
although exposure to retrieval practice failure may serve 
to reduce overconfidence, it is definitely not a universal 
tool for improving metacognitive accuracy. The possible 
mechanism is perhaps more like changing temporal mind-
-set rather than increasing metacognitive ability.
It remains unclear whether monitoring effectiveness 
as such can be influenced by an experimental manipula-
tion. The results gathered and analysed above suggest 
that a single experimental manipula tion is not likely 
to improve monitoring effectiveness, but the results 
obtained after a long -term course (Niedzwienska, 2004b) 
suggest improvement in monitoring effectiveness. It 
seems reasonable to suggest that improving monitoring 
effectiveness requires more extensive, and perhaps long-
-term interventions, that allow the participants not only to 
gain metamemory knowledge, but also to change beliefs 
about the accuracy of their own’s recollections, especially 
vivid ones. It is worth noting that the improvement in 
monitoring resolution is inferred here only on the basis of 
the patterns of results and their interpretation that comes 
from Koriat and Goldsmith’s (1996) model. More certain 
knowledge concerning these mechanisms could be obtained 
by measuring confidence and matching it with the actual 
correctness for each question (see Higham, Luna, & 
Bloomfield, 2011, for application of this methodology 
in the misinformation effect paradigm). To our best 
knowledge, there are no studies that focused on improving 
memory performance and directly measured resolution in 
this way.
In the study by Scoboria et al. (2014b), participants’ 
accuracy was improved after the retrieval training related 
to various aspects of meta cognition (participants correctly 
rejected more unanswerable questions). As the authors 
emphasize: “gains for responding to unanswerable 
questions occurred at no cost to the quality of responses 
made to answerable questions” (p. 213). The pattern of 
results suggests again that metacognitive accuracy was 
improved in the trained group. Importantly, the training was 
extensive and referred to various aspects of metacognition 
and memory.
Control decisions and adequacy
As we indicated in the second section, memory 
performance is largely dependent on monitoring effecti-
veness, but also on the mechanisms of control. One of 
the factors influencing control processes is the knowledge 
whether volunteered responses will remain private or will 
become public. McCallum, Brewer and Weber (2016) 
found that when aware that their answers would not be 
individually identifiable, participants volunteered more 
fine -grain responses. The possible explanation of this 
relationship is that when the answers remain private there 
is no possibility of negative consequences (e.g. negative 
judgement). The authors confirmed that the possibility 
of negative consequences mediated the change in control 
processes. When monetary incentives were introduced 
(Experiment 2), participants who were told that they would 
not be penalised for inaccurate reporting were also more 
likely to volunteer fine -grain responses. In short, participants 
presented effective monitoring across both experiments, 
but their control decisions were affected by the potential 
negative consequences of providing the wrong answer.
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Several examples from the literature support the idea 
that metamemory processes can be influenced by conditions 
at encoding (e.g. Pansky et al., 2009; Sauer & Hope, 
2016). Encoding in the conditions of divided attention 
impaired monitoring processes compared to encoding 
in the conditions of full attention (Pansky et al., 2009). 
However, these results were not supported in the study by 
Sauer and Hope (2016). They found that encoding in the 
conditions of divided attention did not impair monitoring 
resolution; participants were less accurate in fine -grain 
responses, compared to the participants in the full attention 
condition, but rated their fine -grain responses with lower 
confidence. Interestingly, accuracy in the divided attention 
condition was reduced even though participants provided 
fewer fine -grain details in this condition. The authors found 
that the participants had enough knowledge about their 
accuracy, but they chose to sacrifice accuracy for quantity. 
Their metacognitive control -related decisions can thus 
account for the pattern of results obtained (for the detailed 
differences between the two studies see Sauer and Hope, 
2016, p. 152).
The studies reviewed above indicate that metamemory 
processes (control processes, and presumably also moni-
toring processes) can be influenced by the interventions that 
are focused on improvement of retrieval and/or metacogni -
tive accuracy, but also by other factors such as conditions 
at encoding or a possibility for negative con sequences. As 
remembering does not occur in social vacuum, the reac-
tions of other people (either real or implied) are also likely 
to influence metamemory processes. Findings on memory 
conformity (e.g. Wright, Mathews, & Skagerberg, 2005; 
Allan, Midjord, Martin, & Gabbert, 2012) demonstrate that 
people estimate how well certain information is remem-
bered when deciding whether to conform to the information 
given by others. The term “memory conformity” is used 
to describe the situation in which two people witness 
the same event and talk about it, and the information 
introduced by one person influences the other person’s 
memory report (Gabbert, Memon, & Wright, 2006). 
The subject of research on memory conformity is “how 
information provided by other people affects the contents 
of a memory report” (Zawadzka, Krogulska, Button, 
Higham, & Hanczakowski, 2015, p. 2). If the effect of 
monitoring processes (“how well I remember”) influences 
decisions about whether to conform, another question is 
whether the metamemory processes (monitoring or control) 
can be influenced by the information that is provided by 
other people. The relationship between social feedback 
and metacognitive processes was explored by Rechdan 
and colleagues (Rechdan, Sauer, Hope, Sauerland, Ost, 
& Merckelbach, 2017; Rechdan, Hope, Sauer, Sauerland, 
Ost, & Merckelbach, 2018). In the first study (2017), 
they hypothesized that social comparative feedback 
(positive, negative, or none) that was presented during 
completing a computer task, would influence participants’ 
metacognitive monitoring and control processes, and, 
subsequently, their memory reports. Social comparative 
feedback was presented as the test percentile that indicated 
an overall accuracy of a co -witness in the test concerning 
the witnessed event (a video). In fact, all scores were 
fabricated by the experimenter and the participants received 
either the information that a co -witness performed very 
accurately, or very poorly. However, social comparisons 
did not affect the metacognitive appraisals. The authors 
reasoned that social feedback that is indirectly encountered 
(i.e. via computer task) may not be as effective as direct 
feedback. The effect of a co -witness discussion on the 
grain -size and confidence of memory reports was then 
explored (Rechdan et al., 2018). A confederate either 
agreed or disagreed with participants’ answers about the 
video; the control group had no feedback at all. Participants 
in the disconfirming condition gave fewer fine -grain 
responses. This was not accompanied by a decrease 
in participants’ confidence ratings in relation to these 
responses, though. As the authors (Rechdan et al., 2018, 
p. 6) conclude, “social feedback manipulation had an effect 
on participants’ metacognitive control decisions (grain-
-size volunteering), but no effect on their metacognitive 
monitoring (as reflected by subjective confidence)”. None 
of the manipulations used (Rechdan et al., 2017; 2018) had 
an effect on monitoring resolution.
In sum, there are various ways of improving memory 
performance that are based on very different techniques 
and thus, presumably, underlain by different metacognitive 
mechanisms. We described interventions based on a single 
mechanism: (1) improving metacognitive accuracy via 
reducing overconfidence due to experiencing the retrieval 
practice failure, (2) getting the most of quantity -accuracy 
trade -off by moderating the incentive for accuracy, 
(3) increasing quantity with no costs for accuracy due to the 
enhanced relative retrieval fluency in the conditions of poor 
monitoring resolution (for the medium confidence range 
items). These interventions were successful in improving 
memory performance, but, as we argued above, they were 
not likely to generally improve monitoring resolution or 
control sensitivity. The underlying mechanisms, such as 
reducing overconfidence, changing the control criterion, and 
affecting relative retrieval fluency, may be best understood 
as changing the temporal mind -set, rather than improving 
metacognitive ability. To investigate this issue further, we 
analysed the results of the studies on the factors potentially 
influencing the processes of monitoring and control. What 
we found is that neither conditions at encoding (Sauer 
& Hope, 2016), nor social feedback (Rechdan et al., 
2017; 2018) influenced monitoring resolution or control 
sensitivity. Therefore, we conclude that although the control 
decisions are naturally influenced by situational factors, 
such as incentives to be accurate (e.g. Koriat & Goldsmith, 
1996), or the possibility of negative consequences 
(e.g. McCallum, Brewer, & Weber, 2016), the control 
sensitivity and monitoring resolution are not.
These data lend additional support to the idea that 
monitoring ability is resistant to change. It appears, though, 
that extensive or long -term interventions may lead to 
changes in metacognitive ability. As we argued above, 
the patterns of results of the studies by Niedzwienska 
(2004b) and Scoboria et al. (2014b) imply that the inter-
ventions they used did influence metacognitive  abil ity. 
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However, both studies included quite complex inter-
ventions. In the first study, the subjects participated in 
the course on autobiographical memory (30 hours over 
the course of a few months), which presumably influenced 
their metamemorial awareness via considerable extension 
of their knowledge about memory. The second study used 
the extensive training procedure that was based on scien-
tific research and affected various aspects of metacognition.
To conclude, various factors may lead to improved 
retrieval, but only some of them involve the genuine 
improvement of metacognitive ability. In the two studies 
discussed above (Niedzwienska, 2004b; Scoboria et 
al., 2014b), monitoring resolution was not measured 
directly. However, the patterns of results suggest that 
the change in the memory performance was due to the 
improved monitoring resolution. At the same time, in 
the real -life situations, like the eyewitness recall, we are 
hardly interested in anything more than whether we can 
obtain improved accuracy with no costs in quantity or 
vice versa.
Suggestions for future research
Problems to solve
The validation process and memory accuracy
In the second section we discussed various meta-
cognitive judgements (belief in the event’s occurrence and 
the recollection’s accuracy) that contribute to and influence 
the process of remembering. A considerable set of data 
confirms that the processes of recollection and belief 
(e.g. Scoboria et al., 2014a), and judgements of accuracy 
and recollection (Scoboria & Pascal, 2016) are separate 
and stem from distinct underlying mechanisms. Not only 
are these processes separate, but also the judgements 
of occurrence and accuracy may act as control factors 
that are external to the memory system but contribute to 
remembering in the process of validation/reality check 
(Blank, 2017). However, it remains unclear, how this 
process of validation, i.e. transforming recollection into 
believed memory, influences memory accuracy. Blank’s 
(2017) theoretical proposal of the two validation systems, 
i.e. System 1 -type (heuristic, automatic) versus System 
2 -type (elaborate), defines the system 2 -type processing 
as more reliable, and, at the same time, consuming more 
resources. It may suggest that when one moves toward 
more elaborate processing (different strategies are not 
separate categories, but rather different ranges at the 
continuum of the possible ways of processing), memory 
accuracy should increase. Blank (2017) suggests that 
the accuracy of distinguishing recollection from other 
sources of information depends on considerations upon 
general plausibility, social information (that can be used 
“for the better”), and how extensive versus automatic 
the process of reality checking is. In contrast, the reality 
monitoring framework (Johnson & Raye, 1981) ties the 
accuracy of distinguishing recollection from other sources 
of information to the characteristics of mental contents. 
The fundamental assumption of the reality monitoring 
framework is that memories from the external and internal 
sources differ as a class. Firstly, for those generated 
externally, spatial and temporal characteristics are better 
encoded. Secondly, externally generated memories typically 
have more sensory attributes. Moreover, they should also 
be more semantically detailed. An example of evidence for 
this fundamental assumption is the fact that it is easier to 
discriminate between the memories of external and internal 
events than between two memories of external origin 
(Raye & Johnson, 1980). As we understand Johnson and 
Raye’s (1981) proposal, it connects the accuracy of the 
reality monitoring process to the proper recognition of the 
perceptual or other phenomenal characteristics of a mental 
representation.
Still, to our best knowledg e, there are no studies 
exploring how metamemory appraisals of belief in occur-
rence or accuracy influence memory performance. It may 
stem from the fact, as Johnson and Raye (1981) suggested, 
that the evidence for the constructive nature of memory 
has sometimes been misconstrued as the evidence against 
reliability of memories altogether. Such a notion might have 
prevented thorough research on the issue of veridicality 
as related to various monitoring processes. However, 
some degree of cognitive elaboration is entangled in any 
memory, and acknowledging the contribution of thinking 
to the process of remembering does not equal “the hopeless 
entanglement of memories derived from perception and 
reasoning” (Johnson & Raye, 1981, p. 68).
How to differentiate between recollection and information 
from other sources
Information derived from the context is by no means 
necessarily harmful for accuracy (e.g. it can be used “for 
the better” or to provide information about the past, see the 
second section). Yet, there certainly are situations, when 
it is necessary to differentiate between the information 
that stems from recollection, and the information from 
other sources (including internal sources, as the reality 
monitoring framework defines them). The eyewitness 
testimony is an example of such situation: we want to rely 
on recollection only. Two important questions thus arise. 
Firstly, whether it is possible to enhance distinguishing 
between recollection and information that stems from 
other sources. Secondly, what metacognitive processes 
mediate this differentiation. Addressing these questions 
is vitally important not only for the applied issue of 
eyewitness memory, but also for understanding the nature 
of the metacognitive control involved in the retrieval of 
events.
Goldsmith (2008) proposes two lines of “defense” 
against reporting the unintentionally erroneous informa-
tion. The first line is based on the processes of monitoring 
and control. The person should firstly consider “cues and 
heuristics to evaluate the source and likely accuracy of the 
information that comes to mind” (Goldsmith, 2008, p. 88) 
and then decide whether to report the information or not, 
and at what level of specificity. As we broadly dis cussed 
above, such strategic control improves the accuracy of 
memory reports. In addition, research on memory confor -
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mity suggests that people effectively use their meta memory 
processes to discriminate between reliable and unreliable 
sources of information, based on provided feedback, and 
therefore conform to the reliable sources, but not to the ran-
dom ones (Zawadzka et al., 2015). However, Goldsmith 
(2008) suggests that the first line of defense that is created 
by monitoring and control processes is by no means suf-
ficient, and therefore the “second line” is needed. The pro-
posed “second line” is related to how an investigation is 
carried out. It includes avoiding leading questions and lead-
ing line -ups or using the cognitive interview, but also devel-
oping various tools of “interpersonal reality monitoring” 
(Goldsmith, 2008, p. 98).
Confidence ratings and accuracy appraisals
As we mentioned in the second section, Scoboria 
et al. (2015) put together appraisals of belief in accuracy 
that have been analysed in the autobiographical memory 
research and confidence ratings that have been analysed 
in metamemory literature. As we presented above, Koriat 
and Goldsmith’s (1996) model proposes several ways 
of improving memory performance by influencing meta-
cognitive control and monitoring processes. However, 
as the nature of the relationship between confidence 
ratings and more general accuracy appraisals is unknown 
(Scoboria, Talarico, & Pascal, 2015), translating findings 
from metamemory research to the field of autobiographical 
memory would be, for the time being, unjustified.
Memory accuracy within autobiographical memory
It is worth noting that direct testing of memory 
accuracy and quantity is relatively easy in research that 
is rooted in Koriat and Goldsmith’s model. In contrast, 
for autobiographical memory, to which the model of 
judgments of recollection, belief in occurrence and 
accuracy pertains, the original information is usually not 
available. This probably can account for lack of research 
focused directly on the influence of these judgments on 
memory performance. Developing paradigms and research 
procedures in the field of autobiographical memory which 
enable focusing on accuracy with greater reliability is 
desirable also for this reason. The Koriat and Goldsmith’s 
framework (1996) is designed to analyse the memory 
performance on the tasks in which the retrieved information 
can be compared with the original information, and 
therefore its accuracy can be assessed. This approach is 
generally possible in the field of autobiographical memory, 
but puts considerable restrictions on the conditions of 
the study and nature of the questions asked (for example, 
the experimenter can ask only about those details that can 
be verified, or they may need to record the whole situation 
that is later reported as someone’s personal memory and 
compare the details etc.).
Moreover, it is possible that the accuracy within auto-
biographical memory is influenced by various factors 
differently than outside of autobiographical memory. In 
our opinion, situational demands (including social pres-
sure) play an important role in remembering all types 
of information. However, autobiographical memories 
may be perceived as especially sensitive to the influence 
of various schemas that are connected to the Self. 
Maruszewski (2010) describes the mechanism of Working 
Self, which is responsible for the achievement of personal 
goals in autobiographical remembering and is a “main 
structure responsible for construction of autobiographical 
memories” (p. 1). These personal goals may stem from both 
situational demands and the relatively permanent personal 
hierarchy of goals and values.
Existing theories and paradigms  in the process 
of integration
We argued that the source monitoring and reality 
monitoring frameworks may help to integrate auto biogra-
phical memory research and metamemory research. It 
seems also a promising ground for better under standing 
the relationship between the belief in occurrence and 
accuracy appraisals and memory performance. Situational 
characteristics and stronger incentives for accuracy are said 
to lead to more extensive and elaborate (System 2 -type) 
metamemory appraisals. Similarly, one of the main 
ideas of the source monitoring framework (SMF) is 
that rememberer’s current orientation influences source 
discriminations: “some tasks orient rememberers to 
making fine source discriminations with high confidence 
(e.g. testifying in court) whereas others orient individuals 
toward some other goal (e.g. telling an amusing story) with 
little regard to the sources of thoughts and images that 
come to mind while working toward that goal” (Lindsay, 
2006, p. 2). Studies on the SMF could inform research on 
the role of belief in autobiographical memory, and perhaps 
vice versa. Moving beyond noting similarities toward the 
integration of knowledge is likely to provide valuable 
insights.
Another perspective which may ultimately contribute 
to the research on recollection and the belief in occurrence 
judgments is the remember/know paradigm (e.g. Mickes, 
Seale -Carlisle, &Wixted, 2013). This is a paradigm used 
to examine one’s subjective experience that is related 
to retrieval. Retrieval may be associated with different 
states of awareness: remembering and knowing. Typically, 
remember judgements denote conscious recollection, 
while know judgements do not (McCabe & Geraci, 2009). 
However, some comments on the possible contribution of 
this paradigm may be useful. Wais, Mickes and Wixted 
(2008) state that the currently dominating view on 
remember/know judgments is that “remember” responses 
are based on recollection, whereas familiarity underlies 
“know” answers. The authors undermine this logic and 
argue that if “know” decisions about remembering 
are based on familiarity, and devoid of recollection, 
the source recollection accuracy for them should be at 
chance. The results of Wais et al.’s (2008) study proved 
otherwise; the accuracy of the source remembering was 
significantly above chance for both types of answers 
which suggests that “know” answers were not devoid of 
recollection. As such, “know” judgments are not supposed 
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to involve different processes compared to “remember” 
judgments, but to reflect “different levels of memory 
strength” (p. 400, Wais et al., 2008). While “remember” 
judgments are usually provided for strongly recollected 
and familiar memories, “know” judgments are associated 
with lower levels on dimensions of both recollection and 
familiarity. Some researchers (e.g. McCabe & Geraci, 
2009) suggest that in order to clarify what memory-
-states possibly underlie participants’ responses, neutral 
terminology and source -specific instructions should be 
applied instead of the remember/know distinction that are 
usually used. Nonetheless, we believe that the remember/
know perspective can inform research on recollection 
and judgments of belief in autobiographical memory. As 
the remember/know paradigm has been developed much 
longer than research on autobiographical recollection and 
belief in its occurrence, the findings from the former may 
serve as the hypotheses for the studies on autobiographical 
memory and thus be confirmed or rejected in a different 
context.
In short, it is likely that further research aimed at 
integration of knowledge about the role of metamemory 
appraisals in autobiographical memory with other perspec-
tives will provide valuable insights in terms of both theoret-
ical understanding and directing future research. However, 
it  should be stressed that our review and the conclusions we 
draw address only some aspects of metacognitive processes 
in remembering, and our primary goal was to contrast 
a well -established perspective of strategic regulation in 
memory with a relatively new concept of belief appraisals 
in autobiographical memory. Much integration of meta-
cognition and memory has already occurred in other areas, 
e.g. learning semantic material, self -regulated learning and 
various aspects of encoding (e.g. Dunlosky et al., 2013; 
Efklides, 2014; Efklides, Schwartz, & Brown, 2018).
Venues for future research
When discussing mechanisms underlying the impro-
vement, we argued that the studies which focus on single 
aspects of remembering, such as the relative retrieval 
fluency or experiencing retrieval failure, cannot serve as 
universal tools for improving metacognitive accuracy. 
The apparent scarcity of studies that have focused on 
the influence of various aspects of metacognition on the 
accuracy (and quantity) of memory reports shows the need 
for using experimental interventions that comprise various 
aspects of metacognition, similar to the intervention used 
by Scoboria et al. (2014b). Of particular value would be 
to explore if the intervention that successfully supports the 
correct rejection of unanswerable questions will be equally 
effective in other contexts, e.g. in supporting correct 
rejection of erroneous information coming from other 
source.
Furthermore, designing a series of experiments 
to unconfound the effects of a single manipulation from 
the “successful” set of manipulations that build the whole 
intervention, would not only enable to see which specific 
manipulation is the most effective in particular context, 
but also how different aspects of metacognitive control 
mecha nisms may foster or impair each other’s action. 
On a theoretical level, such clarification would provide 
valuable insights into mechanisms of improvement of 
memory performance that result from metacognitive 
manipulations.
Another important question is related to the duration 
and extent of the experimental intervention that aims at 
influencing metacognitive processes, and thus increasing 
memory performance. Most of the studies that we discussed 
used a one -session intervention. Undoubtedly, shorter 
interventions are easier to control, and thus less prone to 
be influenced by random disturbing factors. Designing 
an experimental intervention that lasts weeks or months 
requires more ingenuity and effort. As we argued above, 
the mechanisms underlying an improvement in the accuracy 
of remembering within a short time (one session) and 
an improvement in performance within a longer time 
(e.g. several months) may differ. Similarly, some changes in 
the metacognitive functioning may not likely to be achieved 
quickly, e.g. reconstructing beliefs about the accuracy of 
one’s own memories. What is more, the studies in which 
the intervention is placed immediately after remembering 
the material are by no means typical for remembering 
events. In many instances events may occur weeks or 
months before the time when the questions concerning 
them are asked.
The promising (in terms of a rise in both the quantity 
and accuracy of memory reports) results of the study 
by Niedźwieńska (2004b) suggest that long-term inter-
ventions that are focused on metacognitive knowledge 
and challenging the beliefs on accuracy of one’s 
recol lections are potentially effective and worth 
exploring.
There are definitely many factors that are able to 
influence control decisions during remembering, and 
a considerable amount of research that has explored 
them (e.g. Rechdan et al., 2017; Rechdan et al., 2018; 
McCallum et al., 2016). Still, further research on what 
factors (and in what conditions) regulate participants’ 
control decisions may lead to building a more extensive 
knowledge on the nature of the control mechanisms. For 
example, it would be worth exploring if simple statements, 
similar to post -warnings in the misinformation effect 
studies but adapted to the type of information presented 
and the type of retrieval task, would prove effective 
(e.g. “some of the information in the paragraph may have 
been inaccurate”, Greene, Flynn, & Loftus, 1982; “please 
only report details that you remember seeing. Be sure to 
report only those details that you are sure about and do 
not attempt to guess”, Wright, Memon, Skagerberg, & 
Gabbert, 2008). To explore the mechanisms of this kind 
of intervention, it is necessary to control for the level of 
monitoring resolution. More specifically, if this intervention 
(1) did not affect monitoring resolution (measured as ability 
to discriminate between correct and incorrect answers), and 
(2) was effective in the conditions of very good monitoring 
but detrimental in the conditions of poor monitoring levels, 
204 Ewa Skopicz -Radkiewicz, Agnieszka Niedzwienska
its mechanisms would probably be limited to changing 
the control criterion, namely changing the “threshold” of 
confidence required to volunteer an answer. As we argued 
above, of particular importance would be choosing and 
developing such interventions that would have a potential 
of improving metacognitive accuracy, instead of only 
moving the control criterion.
Nonetheless, building the knowledge about the factors 
that have a potential to regulate one’s control decisions is 
also important. We described several such factors: reducing 
overconfidence, potential for negative consequences, 
possibility of the answers becoming public, conditions 
at encoding and social feedback. The list is by no means 
complete and its development, as we indicated above, 
would inform the knowledge about the mechanisms 
underlying control processes. Moreover, if we have more 
complete knowledge about factors which affect the control 
criterion (and in which direction) we can predict whether 
introducing such a factor would be beneficial or rather 
detrimental in certain conditions (provided we can control 
the monitoring effectiveness).
Conclusions
We presented a theoretical and empirical integration 
on the topic of metacognition and its influence on retrieval. 
As we indicated in the second section, a significant part 
of research that has focused on improving memory 
performance via metacognition is influenced by the model 
of strategic regulation of memory (Koriat & Goldsmith, 
1996). The interventions based on this model that referred 
to various mechanisms, proved to be effective in improving 
remembering accuracy and quantity. We argued, though, 
that the pattern of results obtained in most of these studies 
suggests the regulation of control decisions, and not an 
increase in metacognitive ability, as the mechanism of 
improvement. The results of the studies on the factors 
potentially influencing the processes of monitoring and 
control (Sauer & Hope, 2016; Rechdan et al., 2017; 
Rechdan et al., 2018) provided further support for 
the notion that metacognitive ability is resistant to change. 
However, as the studies using more extensive interventions 
suggest (Niedzwienska, 2004b; Scoboria et al., 2014b), 
an improvement within the processes of monitoring and 
control is possible.
The relationship between metacognition and memory 
performance within the model of strategic regulation in 
memory is well described and has been often explored in 
research. However, for the second model that we focused 
on, a relatively new but intensively explored model of 
appraisals in autobiographical memory, this issue is much 
less clear. The question of how the validation process 
translates into memory accuracy is one of the main 
problems to address. In addition, because of the difficulty 
in controlling memory accuracy in the studies on 
autobiographical memory, we believe that the knowledge 
from the other perspective could bring especially valuable 
insights. The integration of the two perspectives: one newer 
and the other relatively well established may allow to 
(1) use conclusions and findings from the latter as an 
inspiration for the hypotheses in the newer field of 
research (2) better understand both perspectives, thanks to 
connecting it to the source monitoring framework.
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